June 2008
These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Suspended
Anthony R. Castelda (WSBA No. 28937, admitted 1999), of Tonasket, was suspended for 60 days, effective April 7, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to deposit an advance fee into a trust account, treating a client’s advance fee as a flat fee without her informed consent and after representation had ended, failing to promptly provide a client with an accounting of the fees she had paid to him, and failing to promptly refund an unearned portion of a client’s advance fees.
On February 1, 2006, Mr. Castelda met with a client for a consultation to discuss the client’s legal needs as a result of the recent death of her husband. The client wanted to have a will prepared for herself, change the names on two property deeds, change the names on three vehicle titles, and record her husband’s death certificate and their community property agreement which gave her title to the property. Mr. Castelda agreed to do this work; however, upon learning that she would have to meet Mr. Castelda at the Okanogan courthouse to change the title of three vehicles, the client informed Mr. Castelda that she would take care of transferring the vehicle titles herself. At the February meeting, Mr. Castelda and the client agreed that Mr. Castelda would bill at a rate of $150 per hour. Mr. Castelda ordinarily has all new clients sign his standard “Retainer and Fee Agreement” that provides for “an initial fee” that is to be billed against but which is described as a non-refundable retainer. The client declined to sign the proposed agreement. Thus, there was no written fee agreement between Mr. Castelda and his client, and the client did not agree to pay Mr. Castelda a nonrefundable retainer. The client left a check for $1,000 with Mr. Castelda’s front desk as she left the office that day. Mr. Castelda’s staff deposited the client’s $1,000 check into the law office’s operating account. Mr. Castelda believed the fee advance to be a nonrefundable retainer, and no funds of the client were ever held in Mr. Castelda’s client trust account.
On February 2, 2006, Mr. Castelda sent the client a cover letter enclosing a draft will and asking her to bring in her original community property agreement so he could record it with the local County Auditor’s Office. Mr. Castelda also sent the client’s late husband’s death certificate to the County Auditor for filing. On February 6, 2006, the client came to Mr. Castelda’s office and executed the will. On February 7, 2006, Mr. Castelda sent the client’s original community property agreement to the county auditor for filing. This concluded Mr. Castelda’s representation of the client other than providing the client with the recorded documents when they returned from the auditor. The client expected that she would receive a statement from Mr. Castelda in early March as to the portion of her $1,000 that had been used, but received no such statement. In March 2006, the client went to Mr. Castelda’s office to inquire about her account. Mr. Castelda was not in his office and his staff provided the client a statement dated March 1, 2006, from the Timeslips program that Mr. Castelda uses for billings. The statement showed $480 in hourly charges, $54 in costs expended, and a $466 credit balance. The client asked that the credit balance of $466 be refunded. Mr. Castelda’s office staff told the client she would need to talk to Mr. Castelda about a refund.
In March 2006, Mr. Castelda spoke with the client and told her that no refund was owed, as there was a written fee agreement that provided that the $1,000 was a non-refundable retainer. The client disputed that there was a written fee agreement. Mr. Castelda agreed to review his file and call her back. He reviewed his files and verified that there was no written fee agreement. Mr. Castelda sent the client a letter admitting that he did not have a signed fee agreement for a non-refundable retainer. He explained his general practice to treat retainers as earned at the time they are paid, thus non-refundable. The letter stated: “Given the type of work performed for you, and the services rendered, we feel treating this matter as a flat fee earned in the amount of $1,000 is more than reasonable.” The letter also informed the client that Mr. Castelda had discovered “recording errors” in her billing records, which resulted in additional hourly charges of $445. Although the letter claimed $445 in additional charges, the additional entries of time that he put into the Timeslips billing program after the client raised the issue about his fees added only $377 in additional charges, leaving a credit balance of $89. Mr. Castelda believed it would have been reasonable to charge the client a $1,000 flat fee for the work he performed on her behalf. The client believed she agreed to hire Mr. Castelda on an hourly basis only. Mr. Castelda attempted to resolve his differences with the client by sending her a check for $89, the amount of the refund he thought she would be entitled to if he had agreed to work for her on a straight hourly fee basis, taking his recording errors into account. The client believed that Mr. Castelda’s recording errors, which increased his hourly fees, were unjustified. In July 2006, after the client filed a Bar complaint and disciplinary counsel urged him to refund the balance, Mr. Castelda refunded the balance of $377 to the client.
Mr. Castelda’s conduct violated former RPC 1.5(a), requiring that a lawyer’s fee be reasonable; former RPC 1.5(b), requiring a lawyer who has not regularly represented a client to communicate to the client the basis or rate of the fee or factors involved in determining the charges for legal services and the lawyer’s billing practices; RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be affected and the client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure in writing of the material facts; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer who is representing a client in a matter from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and its terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client, the client is given opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and the client consents; former RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; former RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive; and former RPC 1.15(d), requiring a lawyer to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Dustin D. Deissner represented Mr. Castelda.
Suspended
Joseph A. Holeman (WSBA No. 16320, admitted 1986), of Federal Way, was suspended for 60 days, effective January 23, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct in two matters involving failure to communicate and failure to promptly pay clients funds belonging to the clients.
Matter 1: Siblings (clients) hired Mr. Holeman in May 2002 to represent them in a lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle accident in May 1999. The case settled in April 2005. Under the terms of the settlement, $3,000 was paid to each client for their injuries. The checks were sent to Mr. Holeman, and he forwarded them to the clients with instructions to endorse the checks and return them to him. The clients endorsed and returned the checks on July 12, 2005. The clients’ mother made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Holeman to find out when the checks would be disbursed. Mr. Holeman’s phone was disconnected, and he did not respond to mail or e-mail. In November 2006, after the mother filed a complaint with the Bar Association, Mr. Holeman disbursed $3,000 to each client from his trust account. The funds were held in trust from July 12, 2005, until they were disbursed on November 20, 2006.
Matter 2: Mr. Holeman represented a client (client) in a personal injury lawsuit. The parties settled the matter in September 2005, and the auto insurance company sent a settlement check to Mr. Holeman for $54,250. The client’s health insurance company asserted a lien against the settlement for the client’s medical expenses. Mr. Holeman disbursed the settlement proceeds to the client, but withheld $3,402.40 in his trust account to pay the lien. Mr. Holeman did not pay the money to the health insurance company. In January 2006, the client received a letter from her health insurance company requesting payment. The client contacted Mr. Holeman. However, Mr. Holeman did not pay the lien or tell the client that he had not paid it. The client eventually hired another lawyer to handle the uninsured motorist (UM) portion of her personal injury claim. In March 2007, the client paid the health insurance company’s lien out of the settlement proceeds of her UM claim. In June 2007, after the client filed a complaint with the Bar Association, Mr. Holeman paid her the $3,402.50 that he was holding in his trust account. The funds were held in Mr. Holeman’s trust account from September 7, 2005, until they were disbursed on June 16, 2007.
Mr. Holeman’s conduct violated RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; and former RPC 1.14(b)(4), requiring a lawyer to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.
Francesca D’Angelo represented the Bar Association. Mr. Holeman represented himself.
Suspended
Jason M. Wong (WSBA No. 34160, admitted 2003), of Tacoma, is suspended until reinstatement by the Army or discharge, effective March 28, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court, imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order from the Army Judge Advocate General. The suspension resulted from the United States Army’s July 13, 2007, summary of indefinite suspension from practice before Army courts-martial and the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals and revocation of Mr. Wong’s Article 27b Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) certification and his authorization to practice law for the Army.
In November 2006, illegal drugs were discovered with Captain Wong’s personal possessions in unopened factory blister packs labeled Rohypnol (flunitrazepam) and Valium (diazepam). Captain Wong admitted to another Army captain that he brought the drugs to the United States from Cambodia and that he used them for claimed sleeping problems. Captain Wong violated Title 21, US Code, and Art. 112, UCMJ, by wrongfully importing and possessing controlled substances.
Captain Wong’s conduct violated the Army Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers, Army Rule 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; and Army Rule 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Captain Wong.
Reprimanded
Jane G. Bitz (WSBA No. 22970, admitted 1993), of Spokane Valley, was ordered to receive a reprimand on December 3, 2007, by order of the Disciplinary Board following approval of a stipulation. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to provide competent representation and conflicts of interest.
In October 1997, Ms. R created an inter vivos trust known as the R Farm Trust consisting of approximately 200 acres of farmland and 80 acres of timberland located in Idaho. One of her children, DR, was named as trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust were her children and grandchildren, including DR. Ms. R died in April 2000, leaving a will that provided that her estate was to go to her children and grandchildren, including the Idaho farm and the timberland. The will also provided that if any child desired to sell his or her interest in the Idaho farm, the other heirs would have right of first refusal to purchase the heir’s interest in the farmland, and that if the heirs chose to sell the farmland or timberland, they could do so with the consent of all the tenants in common.
In June 2000, Ms. Bitz was retained by DR to represent him concerning the handling of the R estate. In July 2000, Ms. Bitz met with DR’s family to discuss the distribution of the estate. At the meeting, DR presented two offers: one to buy the farmland and one to buy the timberland. One of the other heirs, ER, indicated he wanted to buy out the other heirs’ interest in the farmland at the same price as was offered. The heirs agreed to sell the farmland to ER and to give him until January 2001 to secure financing to purchase the property. Ms. Bitz was asked if the agreement should be in writing. She advised that it should be in writing, but the estate should not have to incur the expense, and that since everyone was present and joined in the decision, under the circumstances, the agreement need not be in writing.
In August 2000, Ms. Bitz wrote to ER and advised him that the trust called for all the property to be sold and the proceeds to be distributed equally among the beneficiaries. This was not a correct statement of the terms of the trust agreement or the legal status of the trust. Ms. Bitz’s letter also stated that ER’s offer was rejected, because the contract to sell to ER was not in writing and not enforceable. Other offers to buy the property were received. Ms. Bitz advised DR that copies of these offers should not go to ER, because he was not to be trusted and might get in the way of closing the other deals. When ER’s lawyer requested copies of the current offers, Ms. Bitz replied that the trustee would consider the request. She informed ER’s lawyer that ER was not trusted by DR, and this was the reason information concerning pending sales had not been given to ER. Ms. Bitz also informed ER’s lawyer that the trustee was given the power and discretion to distribute in cash or in kind under the terms of the trust. This was not a correct statement of the terms of the trust.
In October 2000, Ms. Bitz received an earnest-money agreement from ER’s new legal counsel. Ms. Bitz advised the new legal counsel that because the sale agreement with ER was not in writing, it was not enforceable. In January 2001, ER filed a lawsuit against DR and the other beneficiaries, seeking termination of the trust, distribution of all trust property, and specific performance of the oral contract to sell to him. Ms. Bitz’s firm was retained to represent the defendants. The fee agreement prepared by Ms. Bitz’s firm disclosed a potential conflict of interest among the defendants based on their responsibility for the “circumstances that led to the lawsuit being filed.” The fee agreement also disclosed a potential conflict of interest between DR and the other beneficiaries because of the duty he owed to them as trustee. The agreement contained the opinion of Ms. Bitz and her partner that the conflict of interest was outweighed by the economy of having one law firm defend the lawsuit. The opinion of Ms. Bitz and her partner stated that the claim brought by ER was without merit and would be quickly dismissed. The disclosure had all the defendants agree that DR had acted in the best interests of the beneficiaries in managing the trust and dealing with ER. If anyone did not agree, they were advised to seek separate representation. The conflict disclosure did not address Ms. Bitz’s conflict of interest based on her earlier advice to DR as trustee.
In May 2001, and during the pendency of the lawsuit, DR, as trustee, sold the 80 acres of timberland. Ms. Bitz did not advise DR to notify ER of the offer on the timberland, and DR did not do so until after the property was sold. There was no agreement by all of the parties to sell the timberland for the price for which it was sold. In July 2001, Ms. Bitz notified all of the beneficiaries that the trustee had sold the timberland and admitted that the trustee was acting on the advice of her firm to sell the property and close the transaction. Ms. Bitz also disclosed that she had failed to advise them that Washington law required prior written notice to all of the beneficiaries. Ms. Bitz continued to represent the beneficiaries in the pending lawsuit. In November 2001, the farmland was transferred to the beneficiaries.
Also in November, the court issued an oral decision in ER’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the sale of the 80 acres of timberland violated RCW 11.10.140, as the sale was a non-routine transaction that required notice, and that DR as trustee breached his fiduciary duty by not giving said notice. The court also found that the trustee did not wind up the trust within a reasonable time and that the trust should have been wound up within six months, or by October 2000. ER was awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $20,000. On DR’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the court denied DR’s claim for breach of contract. DR appealed the decision denying him specific performance. Ms. Bitz offered to represent DR and the beneficiaries on the appeal, but DR and the beneficiaries terminated her firm and retained new counsel.
Ms. Bitz’s conduct violated RPC 1.1, requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client, which requires possessing the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation; and former RPC 1.7(b), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a third person, or the lawyer’s own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client, and (2) each client consents in writing after consultation and a full disclosure of the material facts.
Debra J. Slater represented the Bar Association. James B. King represented Ms. Bitz.
Admonished
Michael Danko (WSBA No. 14312, admitted 1984), was ordered to receive an admonition on January 9, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to appear in court for a scheduled hearing and failure to properly supervise a non-lawyer assistant.
In October 12, 2005, Mr. Danko filed a notice of appearance in a criminal matter. Mr. Danko’s client was in custody. The pre-trial conference was scheduled for October 12, 2005, but Mr. Danko failed to appear. The pre-trial conference was continued to October 26, 2005, then to November 2, 2005, and finally to November 9, 2005. On November 9, 2005, the court appointed “secondary counsel.” Mr. Danko had conflicting appearances in other courts on each of these dates. He advised his assistant to advise the court. Mr. Danko’s assistant advised the court only prior to the first hearing. The court clerk indicated that Mr. Danko needed to file a motion for continuance. Mr. Danko did not file a motion for continuance.
Mr. Danko’s conduct violated RPC 5.3(b), requiring a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over a non-lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Danko represented himself.
Admonished
Michael Danko (WSBA No. 14312, admitted 1984), was ordered to receive an admonition on January 9, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to diligently represent a client and failure to communicate.
In September 2005, a client retained Mr. Danko to review her boyfriend’s criminal conviction and determine whether grounds existed to file a personal restraint petition. In March 2006, Mr. Danko wrote to the client asking for additional information and she responded promptly. In October 2006, Mr. Danko wrote the client a second letter asking for more information. The client again responded promptly. The client called and left messages more than two dozen times asking about Mr. Danko’s progress on the case. Mr. Danko answered two of those calls and told her he would have an answer in a few weeks. Mr. Danko did not return the remaining calls or provide status information.
Mr. Danko’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Mr. Danko represented himself.
Admonished
Armen L. George (WSBA No. 32290, admitted 2002), of Sammamish, was ordered to receive an admonition on January 9, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to file a 2006 trust account declaration as required by Rule 15.5(a) of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC).
In March 2006, Mr. George paid his WSBA license fees, but failed to file the required trust account declaration. In June 2006, the WSBA auditor sent to Mr. George a letter reminding him of this obligation and providing a second copy of the form. In October 2006, the chief disciplinary counsel sent Mr. George a letter with another blank trust account form. When Mr. George did not respond to this letter, a staff member from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel attempted to call Mr. George and left a voice mail. Mr. George failed to respond to any of these calls or letters.
In March 2007, Mr. George was notified that a grievance was opened against him based on his failure to file a trust account declaration. He was asked to provide a written response within two weeks, but did not respond. In April, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel sent Mr. George a second letter giving him an additional two weeks to respond to the grievance. The letter explained that he would be subpoenaed to a deposition if he failed to respond. The letter was returned unclaimed. In May, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel sent a third letter asking for Mr. George to verify that he received the prior letters, but he failed to respond.
Mr. George’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the ELC in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. George represented himself.
Admonished
Hiram P. Groshell (WSBA No. 5643, admitted 1974), of Tacoma, was ordered to receive an admonition on January 9, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to file a 2006 trust account declaration as required by Rule 15.5(a) of the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (ELC).
In April 2006, Mr. Groshell paid his WSBA license fees, but failed to file the required trust account declaration. In June 2006, the WSBA auditor sent Mr. Groshell a letter reminding him of this obligation and providing a second copy of the form. In October 2006, the chief disciplinary counsel sent Mr. Groshell a letter with another blank trust account form. When Mr. Groshell did not reply to the letter, a staff member from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel attempted to call Mr. Groshell about this, but was not able to leave a message. The staff member left Mr. Groshell a voice mail regarding the trust account declaration in November 2006, but he failed to respond.
In January 2007, disciplinary counsel sent Mr. Groshell written notice that a grievance had been opened against him based on his failure to file a trust account declaration. He was asked to provide a written response in two weeks, but he did not respond. In February 2007, disciplinary counsel sent Mr. Groshell a second letter giving him an additional two weeks to respond to the grievance. The letter explained that he would be subpoenaed to a deposition if he failed to respond. The letter was returned unclaimed. In March 2007, a third letter was sent to Mr. Groshell’s address of record asking him to verify that he received the prior letters, but he failed to respond.
Mr. Groshell’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter.
Natalea Skvir represented the Bar Association. Mr. Groshell did not appear either in person or through counsel.
Admonished
Sean D. Jackson (WSBA No. 33615, admitted 2003), of Seattle, was ordered to receive an admonition on August 7, 2007, following a hearing. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to fully inform a judge during an ex parte communication about all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding an unrepresented party’s failure to appear at a hearing.
At all material times, Mr. Jackson resided and practiced in the Spokane area. In 2005, Mr. Jackson was representing a judgment creditor in a King County Superior Court action. Mr. Jackson undertook to facilitate collection of the judgment on his client’s behalf by arranging for supplemental proceedings of the judgment debtors. The judgment debtors were a Washington corporation and a married couple who were the principals of the corporation (Mr. and Mrs. S). In March 2005, Mr. Jackson caused supplemental proceedings to be set before a King County Superior Court Chief Civil Judge (judge). Mrs. S appeared without her husband and advised the court that her husband was out of the country. The Court advised Mrs. S of the seriousness of her husband’s failure to appear and continued the hearing until March 16, 2005, at 1:30 p.m.
On the morning of March 16, 2005, Mr. Jackson arranged to fly from Spokane to Seattle. Upon arrival at the airport, he learned that his flight was delayed. He was uncertain when he would reach Seattle. Mr. Jackson called his office and asked his assistant to advise the judge’s courtroom of his circumstances. Thereafter, at approximately 11:44 a.m., Mr. Jackson telephoned Mr. and Mrs. S’s residence and left a voice-mail message explaining that the flight would be delayed and proposing a continuance. In the meantime, Mr. Jackson’s office contacted the judge’s courtroom and was advised that Mr. Jackson should appear in court that afternoon as early as practicable. Mr. Jackson’s office then telephoned Mr. Jackson and so advised him. Thereafter, at approximately 11:54 a.m., Mr. Jackson left a second voice-mail message at Mr. and Mrs. S’s residence. The message was to the effect that the debtor examination proceedings would go forward that afternoon, and that the earlier voice-mail message proposing a continuance should be disregarded. Mr. and Mrs. S did not preserve the 11:54 a.m. voice mail. At approximately 1:35 p.m., Mr. Jackson’s office told him that Mrs. S just called, sounding agitated. Mrs. S advised that her husband would not be in court that afternoon and that his failure to appear was reliance on the 11:44 a.m. voice mail from Mr. Jackson.
At approximately 2:00 p.m., Mr. Jackson arrived in the courtroom. Mr. and Mrs. S did not appear. Mr. Jackson told the court that he had communicated with the judgment debtors that morning. Mr. Jackson did not adequately convey to the judge that his communication with Mr. and Mrs. S included an offer of a continuance. At Mr. Jackson’s request, the judge issued a bench warrant for the arrest of Mr. S, who was arrested on March 23, 2005, and held in jail for one night.
The March 16, 2005, supplemental proceedings assumed some prominence in the judge’s memory due to a subsequent motion to quash the bench warrant, which was vigorously contested. The judge subsequently quashed the bench warrant, finding that the court did not have all the relevant information when it issued the warrant for Mr. S’s arrest.
Mr. Jackson’s conduct violated RPC 3.3(f), requiring a lawyer in an ex parte proceeding to inform the tribunal of all relevant facts known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to permit the tribunal to make an informed decision.
Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Sam B. Franklin represented Mr. Jackson. Timothy J. Parker was the hearing officer.
Admonished
Thomas R. Kamb (WSBA No. 16944, admitted 1987), of Mount Vernon, was ordered to receive an admonition on February 4, 2008, following approval of a stipulation by a hearing officer. This discipline was based on conduct involving repeated failure to appear for court hearings.
Mr. Kamb represented a defendant in a Whatcom County Superior Court matter in which the defendant was charged with one count of vehicular assault and one count of hit-and-run with injury, based on an incident that occurred on tribal land in December 2005. Both the victim and the accused were tribal members. The court set a trial date of February 13, 2006, with a status conference to occur at 8:30 a.m. on February 1, 2006, unless a note for entry of plea was filed at least 24 hours before the status conference. Although no entry of plea was filed in the case, Mr. Kamb did not appear at the February status conference. Mr. Kamb states that he was scheduled to appear in another county in another matter at the same time, and that he had called the deputy prosecutor, explained the conflict, and believed he had obtained her agreement to continue the matter. The deputy prosecutor does not believe that she agreed to continue the matter and appeared for the status conference, as did Mr. Kamb’s client.
The parties agreed to continue the trial date to April and the court set a status conference for 8:30 a.m. on March 29, 2006. Mr. Kamb did not appear at the March status conference. The deputy prosecutor appeared at the March status conference, as did Mr. Kamb’s client. Mr. Kamb states that he had a scheduling conflict, and thought an attorney friend had agreed to appear at the hearing for him. In addition, he previously had told the deputy prosecutor that he was exploring the possibility of moving the trial to the tribal court. The parties agreed to continue the trial date to June, and the court set a status conference for 8:30 a.m. on May 31, 2006. Mr. Kamb did not appear for the May status conference. The deputy prosecutor appeared, as did Mr. Kamb’s client. Mr. Kamb states that he left a message at the deputy prosecutor’s office asking for a short continuance until he determined whether the case could be moved to tribal court, but acknowledges that he never spoke directly with the deputy prosecutor.
On or about June 5, 2006, Mr. Kamb appeared in the prosecutor’s office and was told that the case was set for June 12, 2006. On or about June 12, 2006, the court called the case for status conference. The deputy prosecutor was present, as was Mr. Kamb’s client. Mr. Kamb did not appear at the hearing. The court asked the deputy prosecutor to note a hearing date for 8:30 a.m. on June 15, 2006 for Mr. Kamb to appear and show cause why he should not pay terms for his failure to appear at the hearings. The Deputy Prosecutor filed the notice for the show cause hearing and served Mr. Kamb by facsimile. Neither Mr. Kamb nor his client appeared at the hearing. Mr. Kamb denies knowing about the hearing until after it was over, and he believes he received insufficient notice of the hearing.
On June 15, 2006, in open court, the judge orally ordered terms against Mr. Kamb in the amount of $1,000. In July, the judge entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law on order to impose sanctions, which, among other things, directed Mr. Kamb to appear on July 14, 2006, to show cause as to why he should not be held in contempt of court and sanctioned $1,000 for his failure to appear at the hearings. Mr. Kamb appeared before the Judge in his chambers on July 14, 2006, and explained that he had not appeared at one or two of the status conferences because he thought he had the deputy prosecutor’s agreement to continue the hearings and because of personal reasons. The judge entered an order finding Mr. Kamb in contempt. The order specifically declined to impose financial sanctions against Mr. Kamb for his failure to appear for the status conferences, and referred the matter to the WSBA for investigation. In July 2006, Mr. Kamb’s client entered a guilty plea to one count of hit-and-run with injury. The client was pleased with the outcome of his case and does not believe he suffered harm as a result of Mr. Kamb’s conduct.
Mr. Kamb’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Kamb represented himself. Eugene H. Knapp Jr. was the hearing officer.
Admonished
James R. O’Dair Jr. (WSBA No. 13182, admitted 1983), of Lynnwood, was ordered to receive an admonition on January 9, 2008, by order of a review committee of the Disciplinary Board. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to diligently pursue a client’s case and failing to keep the client reasonably informed of the status of his matter.
In July 2005, Mr. O’Dair agreed to represent a client in a dispute with a tool dealer. The tool dealer repossessed a tool box that contained tools that Mr. O’Dair’s client claimed belonged to him. The tool dealer then sold the client’s tools without notice to the client. The client expected Mr. O’Dair to file a lawsuit on his behalf. Mr. O’Dair stated that he was retained only to investigate and advise the client whether he had a valid claim, but he did not prepare a written fee agreement and the terms of his employment were unclear. Mr. O’Dair worked on the case for approximately nine months, but never contacted the tool dealer or obtained copies of correspondence between his client and the tool dealer.
Mr. O’Dair’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; and RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Mr. O’Dair represented himself.
