These notices of imposition of disciplinary sanctions and actions are published pursuant to Rule 3.5(d) of the Washington State Supreme Court Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct, and pursuant to the February 18, 1995, policy statement of the WSBA Board of Governors. For a complete copy of any disciplinary decision, call the Washington State Disciplinary Board at 206-733-5926, leaving the case name, and your name and address.
Note: Approximately 30,000 persons are eligible to practice law in Washington state. Some of them share the same or similar names. Bar News strives to include a clarification whenever an attorney listed in the Disciplinary Notices has the same name as another WSBA member; however, all discipline reports should be read carefully for names, cities, and bar numbers.
Resignation In Lieu of Disbarment
Kevin G. Healy (WSBA No. 16307, admitted 1986), of Seattle, resigned in lieu of disbarment, effective August 13, 2008. Kevin G. Healy is to be distinguished from Kevin M. Healy of Sacramento. In connection with his resignation in lieu of disbarment, Mr. Healy admitted that the WSBA could prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence sufficient violations of the Rules of Professional conduct to result in his disbarment, but did not admit any specific misconduct. The misconduct and violations described in the Statement of Alleged Misconduct (none of which is specifically admitted by Mr. Healy) are as follows:
At all relevant times, Mr. Healy owned, managed, and operated two limited liability companies. Between 1989 and 2007, Mr. Healy had attorney-client relationships with six individuals (including two married couples). During the course of and as a result of these attorney-client relationships, Mr. Healy learned that these individuals all had substantial assets. Beginning in 2006, Mr. Healy convinced one married couple to refinance their home to obtain $160,000 and invest that sum in his company. He later solicited an additional investment of $67,000 from the same couple. Mr. Healy convinced the couple’s son and daughter-in-law to also refinance their home to obtain $200,000 and invest that sum in his company. In 2006 and 2007, Mr. Healy solicited contributions in the amounts of $500,000 and $400,000 from two other clients or former clients, and a total of $300,000 from two other individuals. Based upon Mr. Healy’s representations, the two clients and two other individuals used their residences to borrow the money that they loaned to Mr. Healy. Mr. Healy convinced one client, who was a 92-year-old widow, to form a limited liability company for the sole purpose of inducing her to invest over $1,425,000 of her personal funds in his company by refinancing her previously un-mortgaged home and by liquidating her life savings.
Mr. Healy told the investors that he would use the investment monies to purchase and renovate properties between Seattle and Tacoma situated at or near a light-rail line. Mr. Healy documented the transactions in unsecured promissory notes (with the exception of one client, who received no documentation for his $400,000 loan). The promissory notes included provisions that Mr. Healy would make all principal and interest payments each month on the loans, would pay the principal of the loans off by certain dates, and individuals would receive additional cash. Mr. Healy told one client who wanted his loan secured by real property that he would receive a deed in real property to hold as part of the loan transaction. In April 2007, Mr. Healy gave the client a statutory warranty deed to an apartment building in Tacoma, but specifically told the client not to record the deed, thereby providing no security interest for the client.
Mr. Healy never informed these individuals that his companies had substantial debts or of the risks involved in the investments, nor did he suggest that they seek the advice of independent counsel before investing their money. The terms of the investment transactions were not fair and reasonable. Mr. Healy told many of these individuals that their investments would be perfectly safe. He made such statements as “trustworthiness is the heart of this deal” and “I would not do this deal if I did not trust you and feel in turn that you trust me.” He declared in written statements that even his brother was refinancing his home to invest in the company.
Beginning in October 2007, Mr. Healy failed to make payments as required under the terms of his promissory note with one of the individuals. After January 2008, Mr. Healy had failed to make payments as required under the financial agreements with the other individuals. Mr. Healy owes debts to nine individuals, each debt ranging between $190,000 and $1,425,000.
The violations stated in the Statement of Alleged Misconduct constitute a violation of RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable, the client is advised in writing and given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel, and the client gives informed consent; RPC 1.8(b), prohibiting a lawyer from using information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent; RPC 1.9(c), prohibiting a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter, or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter, from thereafter using information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client or from revealing information relating to the representation, except as permitted by the rules; and RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Kathleen A.T. Dassel represented the Bar Association. John A. Holmes represented Mr. Healy.
Disbarred
Stanley I. Lippmann (WSBA No. 29661, admitted 1999), of Seattle, was disbarred, effective October 24, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct in a number of matters involving misuse of client funds and trust-account irregularities.
Between 2005 and January 2008, Mr. Lippmann engaged in the following conduct:
• Deposited $31,350 advance fees from a number of clients in different matters into his general business account and personal bank account rather than into an IOLTA account, and used substantial portions of those client fees for his own use before fully earning them;
• Disbursed $1,100 from his trust account before waiting for a client’s two $550 checks to clear the banking process;
• Disbursed advance fees to himself without first giving his clients reasonable notice of his intent to do so;
• Deposited $5,000 of a client’s advance fees in one matter into his general business account, rather than into an IOLTA account, and used substantial portions of those advance fees for his own use before earning them;
• Used $4,000 of a client’s advance fees for his own use before earning them in a second matter;
• Obtained an unsecured interest-free loan of $10,000 from a second client with no due date, on terms that were neither fair nor reasonable to the client, without giving the client written notice or reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel, and without obtaining informed consent from the client;
• Obtained an unsecured interest-free loan of $2,000 from a client with no written documentation memorializing the loan, on terms neither fair nor reasonable nor fully disclosed in writing to the client, without giving the client written notice or reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel and without obtaining informed consent from the client; and
• Charged and attempted to collect from a client $42,383.50 in legal fees on a contingent-fee case, after having withdrawn from the case, when the fee agreement made no provision for fees if representation terminated prior to resolution of the case.
Mr. Lippmann’s conduct violated RPC 1.5(a), prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses; RPC 1.8(a), prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client, fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client, the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction, and the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction; RPC 1.15A(b), prohibiting a lawyer from using, converting, borrowing, or pledging client or third-person property for the lawyer’s own use; RPC 1.15A(c), requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients and third persons separate from the lawyer’s own property, which includes depositing and holding in a trust account funds subject to this Rule and identifying, labeling, and appropriately safeguarding any property of clients or third persons other than funds; RPC 1.15(h)(3), allowing a lawyer to withdraw funds to pay client costs and to withdraw earned fees only after giving reasonable notice to the client of the intent to do so, through a billing statement or other document; RPC 1.15A(h)(7), prohibiting a lawyer from disbursing funds from a trust account until deposits have cleared the banking process and been collected, unless the lawyer and the bank have a written agreement by which the lawyer personally guarantees all disbursements from the account without recourse to the trust account; and RPC 8.4(a), prohibiting a lawyer from violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Leslie C. Allen represented the Bar Association. Mr. Lippmann represented himself.
Suspended
Charles S. Ferguson (WSBA No. 18024, admitted 1988), of Seattle, was suspended for one year, effective November 12, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following a default hearing. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to act diligently, failure to communicate, failure to expedite litigation, trust-account irregularities, and failure to withdraw from representation when a condition impaired his ability to represent the client.
On May 13, 2005, Mr. Ferguson entered a notice of appearance on behalf of his clients, who were named as defendants in a Lincoln County Superior Court matter. The clients paid Mr. Ferguson an advance fee of $3,000 to represent them. Mr. Ferguson deposited the funds into his business account, and then sent billing statements to the clients as the funds were earned.
On June 5, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion for default. The plaintiffs had previously sent notice of the motion for default to Mr. Ferguson on June 3, 2005. Mr. Ferguson did not file an answer or respond to the motion for default. On June 21, 2005, an order of default was entered. On the same date, the court entered judgments in favor of the plaintiffs in the amounts of $309,867 and $261,808 plus costs. On June 24, 2005, Mr. Ferguson left a voicemail message for plaintiff’s counsel acknowledging that he owed him an answer and that there was a motion for default set, and indicating that he would provide the answer by Monday. Mr. Ferguson never provided an answer and did not tell his clients about the order of default.
In January 2006, the plaintiffs sent Mr. Ferguson post-judgment interrogatories. In February 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order requiring that Mr. Ferguson’s clients answer the interrogatories. The interrogatories pertained to execution of the default judgment. In March 2006, Mr. Ferguson answered the interrogatories. Every time the clients received any paperwork (approximately 11 times), they faxed the documents to Mr. Ferguson. Each time the clients contacted Mr. Ferguson, he would assure the clients that he was “on top” of everything and not to worry. This representation was false.
In January 2007, Mr. Ferguson filed a motion to stay execution of the sale of his clients’ property pending the filing of a motion to overturn the default. The court denied Mr. Ferguson’s motion. The clients’ property was sold by the sheriff as a foreclosure, in partial satisfaction of the judgments. Mr. Ferguson states that he had been ill, which caused his failure to file an answer or otherwise protect his clients’ property.
Mr. Ferguson’s conduct violated RPC 1.3, requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client; RPC 1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation; RPC 3.2, requiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client; RPC 1.14(a), requiring all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited in one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm be deposited therein; and RPC 1.15(a)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client or, where representation has already commenced, requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client if the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs his ability to represent the client.
Sachia Stonefeld Powell represented the Bar Association. Mr. Ferguson represented himself. Deirdre P. Glynn Levin was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Mary H. McIntosh (WSBA No. 12744, admitted 1982), formerly of Mount Vernon, was suspended for 90 days, effective September 22, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct involving lack of candor to a tribunal and initiating improper ex parte contact with a judge. Mary H. McIntosh is to be distinguished from Mary Ann Mcintosh of Wenatchee.
In November 2004, an individual (T.D.) and his attorney (Lawyer B) brought an action in Skagit County against a trade association and its directors individually. The action, filed in Skagit County Court, was in its infancy in the spring of 2005, and little or no discovery had taken place.
Ms. McIntosh had previously advised one of the trade association’s Board members (client) with regard to bringing a civil action against T.D. She had also previously been involved in a small-claim action and district court appeal involving T.D. By 2005, the relationship between Ms. McIntosh’s client and T.D. had become very hostile, and T.D. bore a great deal of animus against Ms. McIntosh.
Without consulting his attorney, T.D. filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the Washington Department of Licensing (WDL) for records regarding Ms. McIntosh’s client and for the recent audit of the client’s business. T.D. neither called his attorney, Lawyer B, nor sought any advice or assistance from Lawyer B in the preparation of that document. On or about April 18, 2005, the WDL called Ms. McIntosh’s client and indicated that, unless enjoined from doing so, they would be releasing the audit records to T.D. pursuant to his FOIA request. The client contacted Ms. McIntosh and requested that she prevent the WDL from releasing the audit records. Ms. McIntosh contacted the WDL and spoke with an investigator, who informed her that, unless an injunction was entered pursuant to RCW 42.17.330 (Court Protection of Public Records), the records would be delivered to T.D. on April 22, 2005.
During his conversation with her, the client indicated to Ms. McIntosh that he and his wife were leaving for China and would be unavailable. Ms. McIntosh was also scheduled to leave her office on vacation on April 21, 2005, and be gone until May 2, 2005. Ms. McIntosh was aware that her clients were, or would soon be, out of the country and unavailable for signatures on a complaint and pleadings in support of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to block the release of the audit documents by the WDL. The client was also not available to provide the filing fee necessary to commence a separate action. Ms. McIntosh was aware that T.D.’s only available address of record was a post office box, making personal service on T.D. of a new summons, complaint, and other papers for a TRO very difficult.
On April 19, 2005, after reviewing RCW 42.17.330, Ms. McIntosh phoned Lawyer B. Ms. McIntosh decided to seek an injunction of the WDL in the already-filed action, although the injunctive relief would be against a non-party to the lawsuit and the materials sought to be prevented from being turned over were not being sought through discovery in that action. Lawyer B knew nothing of T.D.’s (his own client’s) request to the WDL. During his phone conference with Ms. McIntosh, Lawyer B disclosed that he did not know how to get in touch with his client. He also informed her that T.D.’s FOIA request for her client’s audit records had nothing to do with the lawsuit in which they were involved as counsel for their respective clients. Lawyer B further stated that the Skagit County Court would not have jurisdiction to enter a restraining order against the WDL in the existing action, as the WDL was not a party to the causes of action which were before the court. He advised Ms. McIntosh that she should start a different lawsuit to enjoin the WDL.
Lawyer B was very knowledgeable of the animosity between his client and Ms. McIntosh’s client, as well as the extreme dislike his client (T.D.) had for Ms. McIntosh. Lawyer B knew he could not agree to the entry of a TRO. Ms. McIntosh nevertheless prepared a Motion/Declaration for an ex parte TRO in the existing action. In her declaration supporting her motion for a TRO, Ms. McIntosh implied that Lawyer B had agreed to the order, made misleading statements, and did not set forth the key fact that opposing counsel told her she was legally incorrect in seeking the TRO against an unrelated, unnamed party in the existing action. Ms. McIntosh, in the preamble to the TRO, also stated that Lawyer B “was notified of the defendant’s intention to obtain this order and expressed no objection so long as the hearing could take place after the defendant’s vacation.” Before entering the order, Ms. McIntosh did not fax a copy to Lawyer B to obtain his consent or agreement to the entry of the order or provide him a copy of the order and related pleadings.
On April 21, 2005, Ms. McIntosh went to the Skagit County courthouse at approximately 8:45 a.m. looking for a judge to sign the temporary restraining order. This was before the regular ex parte calendar. Ms. McIntosh flagged down a judge in the court administrator’s office and handed him the motion and order, telling him that Lawyer B had agreed to the entry of the order. She did not tell the judge that Lawyer B not only opposed the TRO being entered in the action, but also objected to an injunction being sought in that action as the action was unrelated to the FOIA request and therefore the relief her client ultimately sought. During her ex parte contact with the judge, Ms. McIntosh also neglected to inform the judge that it was her opposing counsel’s opinion that the injunctive relief she was seeking could not be entered by the Superior Court of Skagit County for those very reasons. The judge signed the order temporarily enjoining the WDL from releasing the records to T.D. Ms. McIntosh returned to her office, left her staff with instructions to mail a copy of the order to Lawyer B and to fax a copy of the order to the WDL, and left for the airport to catch her flight.
Upon learning of the entry of Ms. McIntosh’s order, Lawyer B moved to set it aside. Eventually, an order vacating Ms. McIntosh’s order nunc pro tunc was entered following a hearing on the merits of the respective motions.
Ms. McIntosh’s conduct violated RPC 3.3(f), requiring a lawyer, in an ex parte proceeding to inform the tribunal of all relevant facts known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to permit the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse; and RPC 3.5(b), prohibiting a lawyer from communicating ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law.
Francesca D’Angelo and Joanne S. Abelson represented the Bar Association. Kenneth S. Kagan and John W. Murphy represented Ms. McIntosh. Donald W. Carter was the hearing officer.
Suspended
Jeffrey G. Poole (WSBA No. 15578, admitted 1986), of Everett, was suspended for one year, effective November 1, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court following an appeal. The suspension is to be followed by a two-year probationary period. For more information, see In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Poole, 193 P.3d 1064 (2008). This discipline is based on conduct involving noncooperation with Bar Association investigations and trust-account irregularities.
In 2003, disciplinary action was taken against Mr. Poole concerning Mr. Poole billing clients at his current rates for work performed at a time when a lower rate was in effect. During the investigation, the Bar Association’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) sent a letter on July 24, 2003, requesting that Mr. Poole provide all billing statements that included similar charges. Mr. Poole produced a total of five statements in response to the request. However, after the hearing in that matter, ODC discovered nearly 100 additional 2002 billing statements that contained charges for time over six months old. The hearing officer in the proceeding giving rise to the discipline reported herein later identified “at least” 29 specific bills that should have been produced in response to the July 2003 request.
Another prior disciplinary matter involved improper trust-account procedures. In August 2003, Mr. Poole received a reprimand and probation for this misconduct, and the probation included audits. Although he was required to cooperate with the audits, Mr. Poole failed to cooperate. In addition, during the audits, the auditor discovered some billing statements that fell within the July 2003 request in the previously mentioned disciplinary action that were not produced. The audits led to questions about a specific client’s (Client O’s) account, which was overdrawn by $540 for several months and showed unusual activity. The auditor requested Client O’s billing file. Mr. Poole refused to turn over the billing file as requested despite repeated requests by the auditor and later repeated efforts by disciplinary counsel to obtain the file.
In 2004, another grievance was filed against Mr. Poole involving Mr. Poole’s refusal to turn over Client O’s billing file and the shortage in Client O’s trust account. Mr. Poole did not respond to the grievance, nor did he respond to a 10-day letter under ELC 5.3(e) requiring a response. A noncooperation deposition took place on September 15, 2004. At the deposition, Mr. Poole claimed he was not producing the file because the request was intrusive and overly burdensome. Instead, he produced eight Client O billing statements. After a petition for interim suspension was filed against Mr. Poole, he produced Volume 3 of the Client O file before he was required to appear and show cause why the petition should not be granted. The petition was withdrawn.
Disciplinary counsel found additional bills in Client O’s file that were responsive to the July 24, 2003, request. Disciplinary counsel also found evidence of trust-account violations, including failure to maintain an accurate client ledger for Client O between October 2002 and September 2003, failure to keep all of Client O’s funds in trust between May 2003 and September 2003, and failure to provide accurate accounts to Client O regarding his trust-account funds between October 2002 and September 2003. Mr. Poole also knowingly disbursed funds before deposited items cleared the banking system. Although disciplinary counsel requested additional information, Mr. Poole did not respond. Disciplinary counsel issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Mr. Poole to appear and produce responsive documents at the deposition. The deposition was canceled in February 2005 after Mr. Poole produced responsive documents.
Mr. Poole’s conduct violated RPC 1.14(a), requiring that all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm be deposited into one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts and no funds of the lawyer be deposited therein; RPC 1.14(b)(3), requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his or her client regarding them; RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and RPC 8.4(l), prohibiting a lawyer from violating a duty or sanction imposed by or under the Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Conduct (here, ELC 5.3(e) and ELC 13.8)).
M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Kurt M. Bulmer represented Mr. Poole at hearing. Richard T. Okrent represented Mr. Poole on appeal. Kimberly Ann Boyce was the hearing officer.
Reprimanded
Gregory P. Cavagnaro (WSBA No. 17644, admitted 1988), of Bellevue, was ordered to receive a reprimand on August 15, 2008, by order of the Washington State Supreme Court imposing reciprocal discipline in accordance with an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington following approval of a stipulation. This discipline is based on conduct involving failure to withdraw from representation in violation of the rules, failure to disclose material facts to the court, and failure to properly supervise a non-lawyer assistant.
On May 3, 2005, clients met with Mr. Cavagnaro and his paralegal regarding filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. On that same day, Mr. Cavagnaro electronically filed on behalf of the clients a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and schedules with the United States Bankruptcy Court. At the time they filed the petition, the clients owned an interest in a property on which they resided. The property was their principal asset.
In December 2005, Mr. Cavagnaro obtained information revealing that a relative of the clients owned an interest in the property. Although the date on which Mr. Cavagnaro obtained the knowledge that the clients were actively involved in an adverse possession action is disputed, the bankruptcy petition schedules electronically filed by Mr. Cavagnaro were based on a petition and schedules the clients had previously filed in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding which had been dismissed by the court on motion of the trustee in that bankruptcy. The prior filings included information regarding an adverse possession action and the clients’ counsel in that action. The schedules filed by Mr. Cavagnaro list the adverse possession action as pending. In February 2006, Mr. Cavagnaro learned that the clients had asserted third-party claims in the adverse possession action, and that those claims survived the settlement of the adverse possession action.
• Mr. Cavagnaro did not disclose to the bankruptcy court the existence, ongoing status, or settlement of an adverse possession action involving the clients’ property or of the multiple third-party claims made by the clients within the adverse possession action.
• Despite receiving confirmation of settlement of the adverse possession action in February 2006, Mr. Cavagnaro did not seek or obtain the necessary bankruptcy court approvals for the clients continued participation in the adverse possession action, for the settlement of the action, and for quitclaiming part of their property to plaintiffs in the adverse possession action.
• Mr. Cavagnaro did not inquire into the existence of title insurance and the representation of the clients by another law firm in the adverse possession action. Such inquiry would have led to the discovery that a title company had paid settlement proceeds of $230,000 to one of the clients’ relatives, who paid most of those proceeds to the clients soon after receipt.
• Mr. Cavagnaro left his paralegal unsupervised prior to an important uncontested hearing in the clients’ bankruptcy action and failed to contact his office prior to and following the hearing. During this time, Mr. Cavagnaro’s paralegal engaged in actions (including giving the clients legal advice, filing several pleadings in the bankruptcy, and negotiating with counsel for one of the clients’ unsecured creditors) without Mr. Cavagnaro’s permission or knowledge.
• Mr. Cavagnaro failed to obtain the clients’ original signatures on documents filed in the bankruptcy action.
Mr. Cavagnaro asserts that the clients denied him permission to make disclosure regarding the adverse possession action to the bankruptcy court. The clients dispute this, but do acknowledge that they forbade Mr. Cavagnaro from speaking to their attorneys in the adverse possession action.
Mr. Cavagnaro’s conduct violated former RPC 1.15(a)(1), requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client if the representation will result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; former RPC 3.3(a)(2), prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; RPC 5.3(a), requiring a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the non-lawyer assistant’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.
Scott G. Busby represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Cavagnaro.
Reprimanded
James A. Gauthier (WSBA No. 15767, admitted 1986), of Kent, received a reprimand by order of a hearing officer on March 17, 2008. This discipline is based on conduct involving the production of documents containing false statements and the misrepresentation of the origin of documents produced in discovery.
In 2000, Mr. Gauthier represented a corporate client in a tortious interference lawsuit. The opposition made a discovery request for Mr. Gauthier’s client’s board of directors meeting minutes from 1997 to 2001. Mr. Gauthier’s client prepared and submitted to Mr. Gauthier meeting minutes that contained two untrue statements: that the meetings took place in Mr. Gauthier’s office and that Mr. Gauthier was present at each meeting. Had Mr. Gauthier read the meeting minutes before producing them, he would have known that they contained untrue statements. Mr. Gauthier was in a rush to deliver the responses to opposing counsel and did not read the contents of the meeting minutes provided by the client. Instead, Mr. Gauthier merely attached them to his answer and had them delivered to opposing counsel. When responding to the discovery request, Mr. Gauthier certified that he had read the responses, when in fact he had not read the documents attached and included in the responses.
In another lawsuit involving the same corporate client, opposing counsel served on Mr. Gauthier a discovery request for the production of his client’s bylaws and all amendments thereto. Mr. Gauthier had prepared amended bylaws for his client in 1999, but his client informed him that the original bylaws could not be found. Mr. Gauthier assisted his client in recreating the original bylaws from memory. In September 2002, Mr. Gauthier submitted the recreated bylaws to opposing counsel without disclosing that they were a recent recreation from memory and not the originals.
Mr. Gauthier’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(c), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and RPC 8.4(d), prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
M. Craig Bray represented the Bar Association. Leland G. Ripley represented Mr. Gauthier. David A. Summers was the hearing officer.
Admonished
Michael J. Davis (WSBA No. 25846, admitted 1996), of Tacoma, was ordered by a Review Committee of the Disciplinary Board to receive an admonition on October 17, 2008. This discipline was based on conduct involving failure to protect a client’s interests. Michael J. Davis is to be distinguished from Michael T. Davis of Bellevue and Michael A. Davis of Scottsdale, Arizona.
In early 2006, Mr. Davis agreed to represent a client in an employment dispute. In February 2007, the client retained new counsel and asked that Mr. Davis provide her file to the new counsel. Although Mr. Davis promised to send the file, he did not. The Bar Association’s consumer affairs coordinator left Mr. Davis messages asking that he return the file. In September 2007, the client filed a grievance asking that Mr. Davis return her file. He finally provided the file to the Bar Association’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel on January 10, 2008. The file was in disarray because Mr. Davis had dropped it down a staircase.
Mr. Davis’s conduct violated RPC 1.16(d), requiring a lawyer, upon termination of representation, to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled.
Randy V. Beitel represented the Bar Association. Mr. Davis represented himself.
Non-Disciplinary Notice
Transferred to Disability Inactive Status
Denice L. Patrick (WSBA No. 11655, admitted 1981), of Lynnwood, was by stipulation permanently transferred to disability inactive status, effective December 9, 2008, by an order of the Washington State Supreme Court. This is not a disciplinary action.
