September 1999 

Ethics & the Law
Reporting Professional Misconduct

by Barrie Althoff, WSBA Chief Disciplinary Counsel

Few of us like reporting someone else's misconduct. Whether it is called reporting, informing, squealing, snitching, ratting, tattling or whistle-blowing, it reminds us of primary-school days and sibling squabbles. It is simply not something you did, especially if you wanted to remain "friends" with someone.

The legacy of the past and reality of the present lives in each of us and forms our judgment. We are inclined not to report the offender because we want to give the offender the benefit of the doubt, because we may prefer not to publicize misconduct in our profession, because reporting the offender may make it difficult or impossible thereafter to deal with the offender, and because we don't want to get involved. We may also forgive or discount misconduct since we ourselves may have erred or fear we may do so. Who are we to throw the first stone?

The necessity of exposing ethical misconduct, however, has long been recognized by the profession. Canon 29 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the ABA in Seattle on August 27, 1908, directed that "lawyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession." Washington long ago adopted that directive.1 Although the former canons have been superseded, current ethical rules still echo this directive. And yet we still hesitate to do so and rationalize not doing so. Perhaps because of this mixed legacy of the past and reality of the present, there are many questions about a lawyer's duty to report misconduct. This article looks at and answers some of those questions.

Washington lawyers are governed by the Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs). RPC 8.3, captioned "Reporting Professional Misconduct," governs a lawyer's duty to report misconduct. It states:

(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should promptly inform the appropriate professional authority.

(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should promptly inform the appropriate authority.

(c) This rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

Thus, RPC 8.3 requires and limits reporting of another lawyer's misconduct to (1) a known violation, (2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, (3) that raises "a substantial question" as to that lawyer's "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects," but only if (4) disclosure of the misconduct is not prohibited by RPC 1.6. Each of these factors is further discussed in this article.

Judges, as lawyers, are subject to RPC 8.3's duty to report. In addition, Canon 3(C) of Washington's Code of Judicial Conduct states that when judges have actual knowledge of another judge's or of a lawyer's misconduct which raises a substantial question as to their fitness for office (judges) or as a lawyer (lawyers), they "should take or initiate appropriate corrective action, which may include informing the appropriate authority."

RPC 8.3 states that a lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer or a judge has violated applicable ethical rules "should" inform the appropriate professional authority. The RPCs use the word "shall" to require a lawyer to engage in specified conduct or face discipline for failing to do so, but use the word "should" to exhort a lawyer to engage in specified conduct for which there is no sanction if not done. Thus, Washington's RPC 8.3 urges a lawyer to report misconduct, but if the lawyer does not, the lawyer will not be disciplined. Even though not subject to discipline for not reporting misconduct, during 1998, lawyers filed 125 (six percent), and judges 56 (three percent), of the 1,976 written reports of misconduct filed with the WSBA Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

In adopting RPC 8.3 as aspirational, Washington rejected the mandatory reporting required by Rule 8.3 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (applicable in most states), upon which Washington's RPCs are generally based. The WSBA Special Task Force appointed to review the Model RPCs observed in its 1984 report that some of its members felt that the mandatory rule would not in fact be followed by attorneys and would thus "place an honorable attorney in a difficult position because he or she would be violating an ethical rule." Other members of the Task Force felt the rule made an important policy statement and provided protection to an attorney who complied with the rule.

The Task Force ultimately rejected mandatory reporting based also on its concern that "a mandatory rule would inhibit the usefulness of alcohol and drug abuse committees, which operate successfully because of the confidentiality of the situation. This [ABA] rule appeared to require such committees to report violations to the disciplinary agency." In 1987, the Washington Supreme Court adopted Rule 12.17 of the Rules for Lawyer Discipline which makes privileged confidential communications between a lawyer and staff or a peer counselor of a lawyer-assistance program. Since there is now specific protection for such communications, part of the stated rationale for rejecting mandatory reporting no longer remains. There has been no action since that amendment, however, to make reporting mandatory.

Both Washington's aspirational reporting and the Model Rules' mandatory reporting recognize that a lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences and secrets is a core value of the profession and thus must supersede any duty to report misconduct. Washington's RPC 8.3 recognizes this primacy by specifically cautioning that the rule does not require disclosure of client confidences or secrets protected by RPC 1.6. Thus, if a lawyer's knowledge of another lawyer's or a judge's misconduct arises from a client's confidences or secrets, a lawyer may not disclose that misconduct unless the client gives his or her informed consent or unless otherwise permitted by RPC 1.6. Similarly, RPC 8.3 does not permit a lawyer to disclose another lawyer's misconduct when the lawyer learns of that misconduct in the course of representing the other lawyer as to that misconduct, since that communication is governed by the usual attorney/client privilege. Nor, as discussed above, does RPC 8.3 require a lawyer acting as a peer counselor in the WSBA Lawyers' Assistance Program to report misconduct communicated to him or her in that capacity, since RLD 12.17 protects that communication.

Comment 2 to ABA Model RPC 8.3, not adopted by Washington, states that "a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's interests." Since disciplinary authorities protect primarily the public interest, they may not be able to directly benefit the client. Thus, the client may have little desire to permit disclosure or become involved in a lawyer disciplinary proceeding. Further, disclosure and consequent discipline may remove the lawyer's ability to earn an income from the practice of law and ability to pay the client damages or settlement amounts.

Under RPC 8.3, where the client's interest in confidentiality and the public's interest in disclosure conflict, the client's interest prevails and the lawyer is prohibited from reporting the confidential information unless the client gives his or her informed consent. For example, Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct Opinion 90-13 (1990), under a mandatory reporting rule, opines that a lawyer must respect his client's privileged and confidential communication when the client advised she did not want reported to any disciplinary or law-enforcement authority that she was raped and impregnated by her former lawyer. The new lawyer had no duty to report the misconduct. Similarly, in In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317 (1993), the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the duty of confidentiality over mandatory reporting where a lawyer learned through his representation that his predecessor had embezzled and repaid client funds where the client directed the successor not to report the embezzlement to disciplinary authorities. Similarly, Kansas Bar Association Ethics Advisory Services Committee Opinion 94-13 (January 1995) opined that if the spouse client consented to the disclosure, two partners learning of a third partner's sexual relationship with a client (whose spouse was also represented by the same third partner) may have a duty to report the conflict of interest to disciplinary authorities.

If a Washington lawyer will not be disciplined in Washington for not reporting misconduct, why should the lawyer report misconduct or read the rest of this article?

Washington lawyers regulate themselves through a discipline system administered by the Washington State Bar Association. The legal profession and that system are accountable to the public. For the profession and self-regulation to survive and have credibility, lawyers must themselves adhere to ethical requirements, demand that others do so, and actively assure that the system works. When lawyers turn a blind eye to known misconduct, the public has little reason to trust the profession or to permit self-regulation. If lawyers do not act against unethical lawyers, those lawyers will continue to harm the public and the profession. What may appear to a reporting lawyer to be an isolated case of misconduct may, in fact, be a widespread pattern of misconduct which would likely only appear to a centralized disciplinary authority.

With many lawyers engaged in multi-jurisdictional practices, offending lawyers may be harming clients and the profession in many jurisdictions, and reporting lawyers may be subject to many different reporting requirements, some of which are likely mandatory since most other jurisdictions mandate reporting professional misconduct. Even though a Washington lawyer may not be obligated to report misconduct under Washington's RPC 8.3, if the lawyer is admitted elsewhere, even on a limited pro hac vice basis, the lawyer will be subject to other jurisdictions' reporting requirements. If a lawyer is admitted in Washington and, for example, Illinois (which mandates reporting), and knows of another lawyer's misconduct, must the first lawyer report the misconduct? To Washington or to Illinois, or to both? Does it matter where the misconduct occurred or where the other lawyer is admitted? (See discussion on page 52 to whom to report misconduct.)

The leading case on requiring a lawyer to report another lawyer's misconduct is In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill., 1988), wherein an Illinois lawyer was suspended from practice for failing to report the unprivileged information (a more narrow standard than Washington's "confidences and secrets") that his client's prior lawyer had converted client funds. Instead of reporting the misconduct, the lawyer negotiated a settlement on behalf of his client whereby his client agreed not to initiate any criminal, civil or disciplinary action against the first lawyer. The court's decision, the first reported case of a lawyer being disciplined solely for failure to report known misconduct of another lawyer, has been criticized on a number of grounds, but has also served as a wakeup call to the profession.2 

The RPC 8.3 obligation to report misconduct only applies to a lawyer "having knowledge" of the violation. The terminology section of the RPCs defines knowledge as "actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." Thus, mere belief, suspicion or rumor of another lawyer's misconduct does not trigger the duty to disclose. South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 95-13 (1995) opines that a lawyer having only secondhand knowledge of alleged misconduct does not have the requisite "knowledge" required to have to report that misconduct. The South Carolina court also concluded that a lawyer's duty to report misconduct remains even if the lawyer's client or another lawyer has also reported the misconduct.

Authorities differ on whether the "knowledge" must be objective or subjective. Compare, for example, Attorney U. v. Mississippi Bar, 678 So.2d 963 (Miss. 1996) with Rhode Island Supreme Court Ethics Advisory Opinion 95-40. The Mississippi case, adopting an objective standard, held that a lawyer is not obligated to report misconduct unless the lawyer has supporting evidence whereby a reasonable lawyer under the circumstances would form a firm opinion that the conduct in question had occurred and was of the reportable type.

Since RPC 8.3 uses the phrase "knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct," the rule generally does not require a lawyer to self-report his or her own direct ethical misconduct, although self-reporting may mitigate any disciplinary sanction imposed for such misconduct.3  RPC 8.3 should similarly be interpreted to not require a judge (nearly all of whom are also lawyers) to report his or her own ethical misconduct as a judge.

A lawyer is required to report his or her own misconduct, however, when applying for admission to another jurisdiction, since RPC 8.1 requires that a lawyer be candid and provide full disclosure in connection with bar admission applications. And, subject to a lawyer's constitutional right not to incriminate himself or herself, a lawyer may be obligated to report misconduct of another lawyer even though the first lawyer may have imputed liability as a partner or supervising lawyer under RPC 5.1 for that other lawyer's misconduct. For example, Connecticut Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Informal Opinion 89-2 opines that a lawyer must report his former partner's missing a filing deadline and making misrepresentations to a client even though by doing so he might himself have imputed responsibility for that conduct under RPC 5.1(c)(2).

RPC 8.3 limits reporting to a known violation "of the Rules of Professional Conduct" that raises "a substantial question" as to that lawyer's "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Other misconduct for which a lawyer might be sanctioned (for example, violations of RLD 1.1), but which is not a violation of the RPCs, is not subject to reporting under RPC 8.3. Similarly, as to a judge, the only misconduct subject to reporting is a violation of "applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to a judge's fitness for office."

To be reportable, the known misconduct must raise a "substantial" question. The terminology section of the RPCs defines "substantial" as "denoting a material matter of clear and weighty importance." Comment 3 to the ABA's Model RPCs states that the term "substantial" refers to the "seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware." Thus, a lawyer's minor neglect of a case, or minor failure to communicate, or an isolated act of low-level malpractice are likely not misconduct of the type that should be reported. Texas State Bar Professional Ethics Committee Opinion 523 (1997), for example, opines that an associate has no duty to report known negligent advice of another associate in the firm. Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct No. 90-36 opines that a lawyer is not required to report another lawyer for sending a letter threatening criminal and civil charges against the first lawyer's clients even if that conduct would be prohibited by Illinois ethics rules, because the conduct does not raise a substantial question of the type envisioned by Illinois's reporting rule.

RPC 8.3's standard of reportable misconduct relating to a lawyer's "honesty" or "trustworthiness" likely includes such misconduct as misappropriation of client or other funds, theft, forgery, bribery, kickbacks and lack of candor. It is less clear what RPC 8.3's standard of misconduct relating to "fitness as a lawyer in other respects" is intended to cover. Conceivably, it could include substantially all other serious RPC violations.

Although there is no direct Washington authority, ABA Formal Opinion 94-383 (July 5, 1994) opines that in a civil case a lawyer should not threaten to report known misconduct in order to gain an advantage because the lawyer already has a duty to report the misconduct, and that such threats would also be improper if the misconduct was not related to the civil suit, if the possible charges were not well-founded in law or fact, or if the threat had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden another person. It would appear that a threat of disciplinary action, unless in fact justified by the circumstances of the case, might in some cases constitute criminal extortion, itself the basis for disciplinary action.

A lawyer accused of misconduct might seek to condition settlement with a client on the client's agreement not to report the misconduct to disciplinary authorities. Although Washington does not have any authority on point, such a bar on reporting may well be unenforceable against the client as against public policy. If a lawyer's client has agreed not to report misconduct, however, the client's new lawyer is not free to report that conduct unless the client gives his or her informed consent to such disclosure.4 

RPC 8.3 states that misconduct should be reported to "the appropriate professional authority." For misconduct by a lawyer admitted to Washington, the appropriate professional authority is the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Washington State Bar Association, 2101 Fourth Ave., Fourth Fl., Seattle, WA 98121-2330. For judicial misconduct by a Washington judge, the appropriate professional authority is the Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct, P.O. Box 1817, Olympia, WA 98507.

If the misconduct occurs other than in Washington, or the reporting or offending lawyer or judge is admitted to practice in other jurisdictions, the "appropriate professional authority" may also include the disciplinary agencies of other jurisdictions. Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 94-23 (1995) opines that under Illinois's mandatory reporting rule, an Illinois lawyer who, as a corporate director, learned that the company's president and counsel (both lawyers licensed only in New York) had engaged in what was for the opinion assumed to be dishonest acts must report the two to the Illinois disciplinary authority and also "should" report them to the New York disciplinary authority.

Merely reporting misconduct to the client, or being assured such report is made, does not satisfy a lawyer's duty to report misconduct. For example, in District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee Opinion 270 (1997), a lawyer admitted to his contract lawyer that he had repeatedly deceived a client into believing that he sent aggressive letters as demanded by his client. In fact, the lawyer wrote the letters and provided copies to his client, but never sent them to the addressee. The contract lawyer asked the lawyer to advise the client of the deception, which he did. The opinion opined that the contract lawyer was still obligated to report the misconduct to disciplinary authorities.

If a lawyer who has engaged in known misconduct is believed to have emotional, substance-abuse, or other personal problems, a reporting lawyer may also want, but is not obliged, to inform the WSBA Lawyers' Assistance Program, which may be able to help the lawyer confront and deal with those problems. While Comment 3 to the ABA Model RPCs (not adopted by Washington) states that a "report should be made to the bar disciplinary agency unless some other agency, such as a peer review agency, is more appropriate in the circumstances," it is clear that informing such a program alone does not satisfy a lawyer's duty to report the misconduct to the lawyer disciplinary authority, since the disciplinary authority's mandate to hold the lawyer accountable for, and protect the public from, misconduct cannot be accomplished if the misconduct is not known to it.

A lawyer does not satisfy the duty to report misconduct to the appropriate authority, however, merely by reporting it to a lawyer assistance program. For example, Utah Ethics Opinion 98-12 (December 4, 1998) opines that a lawyer does not satisfy Utah's mandatory reporting duty by merely reporting to a voluntary lawyer assistance program his knowledge of a lawyer's illegal use or possession of controlled substances unless the program has (which Washington's Lawyers' Assistance Program does not) "some measure of authority or official advisory role in the Bar's lawyer-discipline function." Similarly, West Virginia Committee on Legal Ethics Opinion 92-04 (undated) opines that a lawyer who reports to a lawyer assistance program an alcoholic lawyer who had misappropriated client funds must also report the lawyer to the disciplinary authority. Knowledge of another lawyer's misconduct gained through participation in such a program is, however, generally confidential under RLD 12.17 and should not be reported to disciplinary authorities.

Washington's RPC 8.3 states that a lawyer knowing misconduct should "promptly" inform the appropriate professional authority. ABA Model RPC 8.3, on which Washington's RPC 8.3 is based, does not use the term "promptly." U.S. v. Cantor, 897 F.Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y., 1995) suggests that reporting be within a reasonable time under the particular circumstances of the case. More helpfully, ABA Formal Opinion 94-383 (1994) suggests that misconduct of the type envisioned by RPC 8.3 should be reported promptly and not be used as a bargaining chip in a civil case, while less serious misconduct not covered by RPC 8.3, or not within the jurisdiction of the trial court, should instead not be reported until the conclusion of the civil action.

The author generally recommends that misconduct sanctionable by a court, unless truly egregious in nature and likely to threaten imminent and serious harm to other clients or the public if not reported, not be reported to the WSBA until the conclusion of the civil or criminal proceeding. This attempts to reconcile competing interests and the reality that disciplinary authorities generally will defer taking action until other proceedings are concluded, so as not to interfere with, become a party to, or be used for leverage or discovery advantages by the other parties in the underlying litigation.5 

If a lawyer's misconduct is reported, both the reporting lawyer and the reported lawyer are likely concerned about the consequences of the reporting. The reporting lawyer may be concerned about retaliation. RLD 12.11(b) provides that communications to the disciplinary authority "are absolutely privileged, and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be instituted against any grievant, witness or other person providing information." The reported lawyer may be uncertain what to do. RLD 2.8 generally requires that the reported lawyer must cooperate with the disciplinary authority's investigation into the alleged misconduct, and that failure to cooperate is, of itself, misconduct. ABA Formal Opinion 94-384 (July 5, 1994) opines, however, that a lawyer against whom a disciplinary complaint has been filed by an opposing counsel in an ongoing matter is neither required nor permitted on that account alone to withdraw from the representation. Otherwise, of course, merely filing a grievance would disqualify opposing counsel.

If the reporting lawyer is a public employee, Washington's whistle-blower statute (RCW 42.40) and various federal statutes give the employee some protection against retaliation.6  The statutes do not, however, authorize the lawyer to disclose client confidences or secrets. In U.S. ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 (E.D. VA. 1994), an in-house counsel unsuccessfully claimed whistleblower protection after being fired for using confidential client information to try to prove his former client violated federal law. More recently, Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998) held that disclosure by an in-house lawyer of confidential employer information violated Louisiana's RPCs and that she was thus not protected by federal law from being fired for the disclosure.

Where the reporting lawyer is not a public employee, or is a partner instead of an employee, interesting questions arise. For an overview of some issues, see Cynthia Gendry, "Comment: Ethics – An Attorney's Duty to Report the Professional Misconduct of Co-Workers," 18 Southern Illinois University Law Review 603 (1994).

In Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105 (NY, 1992), a law firm associate engaged in reportable misconduct while representing another associate. The second associate reported the misconduct to the firm and asked the firm to report it to disciplinary authorities. When the firm declined, the second associate reported the misconduct but afterwards withdrew his complaint. Later, the firm reported the misconduct. Still later, the second associate was fired, allegedly for insisting that the firm report the other associate's misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that a lawyer's duty to report misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary authority is a term implied in law in every employment contract between a law firm and an employed lawyer and that an employed lawyer fired for insisting that the firm report misconduct of one of its lawyers could bring a breach of contract action against the firm. In Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, 1999 WL 408416 (U.S.D.C., E.D.N.Y., 6/17/99), the Court applied Wieder to an unadmitted law firm associate (law clerk).

In Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 41 Tex. Sup.Ct. 308, 977 S.W.2d 543 (1998), a partner believed another partner over-billed clients, and internally reported it to the firm's managers, who investigated and discussed it with the client (who stated it was satisfied with the bills as reasonable). It is unclear from the opinion whether the matter was ever reported to disciplinary authorities. The managers told the reporting partner that the investigation did not support her allegations. She was also told she should begin seeking other employment, with various representations allegedly being made to her about interim continuation of her partner benefits. Ultimately, the benefits were discontinued, she sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty and of partnership agreement, and the firm expelled her from the partnership. The court observed that a law firm can expel a partner to protect relationships both within the firm and with clients, citing among other authorities, Holman v. Coie, 11 Wn.App. 195, 522 P.2d 515 (1974); a law firm did not breach fiduciary duty for expelling two partners because of contentious behavior during meetings and because one, a state senator, made speech offensive to a major client. The Texas court concluded that the firm did not owe the expelled partner a duty not to expel her for reporting suspected over-billing by another partner, but that the firm had breached its partnership agreement in the manner it had expelled the partner.

An employed (or "subordinate") lawyer is likely to feel torn between the RPC 5.2(a) admonition that the lawyer is bound by the RPCs notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person, and the RPC 5.2(b) safe harbor that a subordinate lawyer does not violate the RPCs if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's "reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." The dilemma is in determining what in a particular case is "reasonable" and what is "arguable."

An employed lawyer may want, or be required by the employer, to first report to the employer known misconduct of another lawyer (whether or not an employee). Model RPC 1.13, relating to an organization as a client, although not adopted by Washington, may give some guidance to a lawyer who learns of misconduct by another organization employee. If the other lawyer works within the same organization, such initial internal reporting permits the employer to learn of and remedy the misconduct, mitigate damages, report it to liability insurers or risk managers, and formally report it to the disciplinary authority. While the employer may also decide under RLD 8.3 that the questioned conduct need not be reported, the employer may not prohibit the employee from reporting the misconduct to the disciplinary authority (subject to the employee's duty not to disclose client confidences or secrets). Thus, WSBA RPC Committee Informal Opinion #1858 (May 14, 1999) (not approved by the WSBA Board of Governors or reflecting an official WSBA position, but reflecting that committee's opinion), opines that an elected prosecutor's direction to a deputy prosecutor not to report, under the deputy's own name, known misconduct to the disciplinary authority violates RPC 8.3 (duty to report) and RPC 5.2(a) (responsibilities of subordinate attorney). If the employer is the lawyer whose conduct the employee believes should be reported, however, public policy would likely not support any purported organizational duty to first report the misconduct to the employer.

Reporting another lawyer's serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities is an important, if unpleasant, duty of every lawyer. Lawyers do not comply with the RPCs merely because they can be disciplined for not doing so; they do so because they are ethical and want to serve their clients and the public well. Even though lawyers cannot be disciplined in Washington for not reporting misconduct, they should do so when permitted as part of their obligation to the public and to the profession. When they do so, we, as a profession, prove to the public and to ourselves that we take our professed ethics seriously and that we are worthy of being entrusted to regulate ourselves. If we fail to do so, we forfeit that trust and have no right to self-regulation or the respect of the public.

1 WA Session Laws, 1917, Section 20.

2 See, for example, authorities collected at ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Third Edition (1996), pp. 554-555.

3 Standard 9.32(e), ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

4 For a thoughtful analysis of the difficult competing interests of clients and of the disciplinary system as they relate to such settlement agreements, see Irwin Miller, Breaking the Written Code of Silence in Legal Malpractice Settlements, 6 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 187 (1992).

5 See, for example, In re Discipline of Gillingham, 126 Wn.2d 624, 896 P.2d 656 (1995), footnote 3, and WSBA Board of Governors' policies of May 17 and July 19, 1991.

6 See Roger Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer,

5 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 291 (1991).

Back to table of contents >>